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Dash: The Equity Cushion Analysis in Bankruptcy

NOTES

THE EQUITY CUSHION ANALYSIS IN
BANKRUPTCY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1
some courts have given the concept of debtor's equity in collateral
undue significance in determining whether to grant a secured creditor relief from the automatic stay in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding.2 This represents an unwarranted departure from the approach developed under the reorganization chapters of the
Bankruptcy Act.3 In questioning the wisdom of this departure, this
note will first discuss the approach developed by the courts under the
Bankruptcy Act to determine whether to grant a secured creditor
relief from the stay. A discussion of the factors which evolved under
the Act necessarily involves consideration of the issue of valuation
which is inextricably involved in determining the extent of the
debtor's equity in the collateral. Following this discussion, this note
will address the automatic stay and the concept of adequate protection under the new Bankruptcy Code and will examine the current
tendency of the courts to interpret adequate protection in terms of
I. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. III 1979). The
new bankruptcy law took effect on October 1, 1979 and governs all cases commenced on or
after that date. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).
The Code is a federal law promulgated under article I, section 8, clause 4 of the U.S.
Constitution as a uniform law on the subject of bankruptcies. As a law of the United States, it
is the supreme law of the land. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI. Thus, where the new law is applicable, it
supercedes inconsistent state laws.
The new bankruptcy law is commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code or the Code
and will be referred to as such in this article.
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (Supp. III 1979). For a general discussion of Chapter 1I
proceedings, see infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Act of Jun. 22,
1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101151326 (Supp. III 1979).
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an equity cushion. Lastly, a discussion of the infirmities inherent in
the equity cushion analysis will be undertaken which suggests that
the courts should revert to the balancing approach developed under
the Act, using the equity cushion as only one factor among several in
determining whether to grant relief from the automatic stay.
II. OVERVIEW
A business seeking refuge in the reorganization provisions of
Chapter 11 invariably is financially distressed. "It has suffered business reverses of any one and probably several basic types. It has lost
money gradually or suddenly .

. . ,

[and] experiences a chronic

shortage of cash and credit making it impossible to carry on the business in a normal fashion and to pay debts as they mature.' '4
The scenario further unfolds as incessant creditors begin to corner the debtor. The debtor is delinquent with virtually all its trade
creditors and many have stopped deliveries or require that they be on
a C.O.D. basis. The debtor's financial plight may be slowing its collections. Suits are threatened or are already instituted while diligent
creditors may in fact be endeavoring to execute on judgments. "Unsecured creditors are demanding security. Secured creditors are demanding more if, indeed, they are not already pursuing non-judicial
remedies against such assets as may be available to them." 5 In short,
the debtor is suffering grave financial difficulties and seeks asylum in
Chapter 11.
The filing of a bankruptcy petition for relief under Chapter 11
of the Code, as was true under the relief chapters of the Act, not
only commences a case,6 but also operates ipso facto as a stay of
certain judicial proceedings and acts.7 The filing of the petition constitutes an automatic stay of all litigation against the debtor and
most actions against the debtor's property, 8 with certain exceptions. 9
4. Festersen, EquitablePowers in Bankruptcy Rehabilitation:Protection of the Debtor
and the Doomsday Principle, 46 Am. BANKR. L.J. 311, 311-12 (1972).

5. Festersen, supra note 4, at 312.
6.

11 U.S.C. § 301. The analogous provisions applicable to the Bankruptcy Act are

found in the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure according to the particular chapter proceeding.
See BANKRUPTCY RULES 8-1 to 13-901, 11 U.S.C. app. tits. II-VII (1976) [hereinafter cited
as BANKR. RULES]. For a discussion of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and their relationship to the Bankruptcy Act and the new bankruptcy law, see infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
7. I1 U.S.C. § 362. For the stay provisions under the Bankruptcy Act, see Bankruptcy
Act §§ 1 (a), 113, 116(4), 148, 314, 414, 428, 614; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 401, 601, 8501, 9-4, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, 13-401.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
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"The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws."10 It affords the debtor desperately
needed protection by giving him a breathing spell from his creditors.
The raison d'etre for the stay of acts and actions to enforce liens
against the debtor's property is the need to protect the estate against
dismemberment and disappearance at the instance of more aggressive creditors.1 1 The comprehensive stay effects this purpose by stopping "all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions."1 2 It is virtually impossible to imagine a successful
rehabilitation proceeding in which creditors were not restrained from
foreclosing on major assets of the debtor.1 3 Preserving the status quo
of the debtor subserves the rehabilitative purpose of a Chapter 11
proceeding by affording the debtor a respite and an opportunity to
develop a viable plan of reorganization.
The debtor, taking comfort behind the protective shield of section 362(a),"' ostensibly secure from the onslaught of creditors, has
in reality set the stage for the conflict between the estate of the
debtor and secured creditors. A creditor, desiring to protect itself
against adverse contingencies that may befall the debtor, often seeks
to have the debtor's obligations secured by an interest in the debtor's
real or personal property.1 5 The creditor assumes that if the debtor
9. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). Other circumstances may compel exceptions to an automatic
stay. See infra note 157.
10. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5840.
11. H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5963, 6297; Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under The New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 3 (1978).
12. H.R. RaP., supra note 11, at 340, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6297; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
13. A simple example will serve to illustrate this point. Where a tree cutter is in possession of certain equipment necessary to carry on his trade, and this equipment is subject to a
security interest, foreclosure by the secured creditor would make rehabilitation impossible. The
tree cutter would not be able to afford substitute equipment and it is obviously impossible for
him to continue working without the equipment.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Thus, allowing foreclosure by the creditor thwarts any possibility of successful reorganization. This situation is even more significant where the debtor is in
possession of millions of dollars of industrial equipment subject to security interests in favor of
various creditors.
15. Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a simple means of creating
and perfecting security interests. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -203, -302 to -305 (1972). A security
interest is defined as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation." Id. § 1-207(37). A secured party is defined as "a lender, seller
or other person in whose favor there is a security interest including a person to whom accounts,
contract rights or chattel paper have been sold." Id. § 9-105(1)(m)(i).
Article Nine of the U.C.C. has been adopted in every state except Louisiana. Thirty-three
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fails to honor the obligations, the security will guarantee satisfaction
of the debt.16 Much to his consternation, however, the secured creditor may find that the debtor has filed a Chapter 11 petition invoking
the automatic stay of foreclosure proceedings.
This turn of events seriously threatens the secured creditor's
property rights. 17 The debtor in possession of the collateral is using it
in his business; the collateral is subject to depreciation and dissipation in the debtor's hands while the secured creditor is kept in abeyance. The oversecured creditor18 will fear that his equity cushion-the amount by which the value of his collateral exceeds his
claim-will vanish because of continued depreciation and accruing
interest. The undersecured creditor1" runs the risk that the collateral
will depreciate until it is valueless, leaving him with only a general
and unsecured claim 20 should the reorganization fail and liquidation
result.
The drafters of the Code were not insensitive to the secured
creditor confronted with this predicament; a source of relief was provided in section 362(d).21 Section 362(d)(1) provides that upon the
jurisdictions have adopted the 1972 revisions of article nine while sixteen remain governed by

the 1962 version.

UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE

U.L.A. 1, 2 (1981).

16. See In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1964); Peitzman and Smith,
The Secured Creditor's Complaint: Relief From the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 1216, 1237 (1977).
17. It has long been recognized that the secured creditor has a property interest in its
collateral protected by the fifth amendment to the Constitution. Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 454 F.2d 9, 13 n.10
(3d Cir. 1972); see Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940).

18.

An oversecured creditor is one whose collateral exceeds in value the claim that it

secures. The Bankruptcy Code, however, speaks in terms of secured and unsecured claims.

Section 506(a) provides that "[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest

. . .

is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such

creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
19. If a creditor has a security interest in property of the debtor, and that property has a
lower value than the amount of the creditor's claim against the debtor, the creditor is

undersecured.
20. An undersecured creditor under the Code has his claim divided into two parts. The
claim is secured to the extent of the value of the collateral; any claim in excess of the value of
the collateral is a separate and unsecured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). This article will not address subparagraph (2) of section 362(d).
This ground for relief from the stay of an act against the property of the debtor has two
elements: (1) The debtor has no equity in the property and (2) the property is not necessary to
an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This section is designed to obviate the
problem of real property mortgage foreclosures of property where the bankruptcy
petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. [This] section is not intended to apply if
the business of the debtor is managing or leasing real property, such as a hotel
operation, even though the debtor has no equity if the property is necessary to an
effective reorganization of the debtor.
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request of a party in interest, the court will grant relief from the stay
by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning it "for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
of such party in interest. 22 The Bankruptcy Act, pursuant to the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 23 provided that relief from an automatic stay could be sought by filing a complaint with the bankruptcy
court, 24 which commenced an adversary proceeding.2 5 The court
could, for cause, then terminate, annul, modify, or condition the
stay.26
Although a grant of relief from the stay under the Act was
within the discretion of the bankruptcy court, 27 courts generally considered four issues to be relevant to an application for such relief: the
debtor's equity in the collateral, the likelihood of material harm to
the secured creditor, the likelihood of rehabilitation, and the property's importance to the debtor's operations.28 Under the Code, the
concept of adequate protection, though left undefined by the drafters, has generally been interpreted in terms of an "equity cush124 CONG. REc. H 11,092-93 (daily ed. 1978)(statement of Rep. Edwards).
The Senate Report states that "this exception is [designed] to reach the single-asset
apartment type cases which involve primarily tax-shelter investments and for which the bankruptcy laws have provided a too facile mehtod [sic] to relay conditions, but not the operating
shopping center and hotel cases where attempts at reorganization should be permitted." S.
REP., supra note 10, at 53, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5839.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

23.

BANKR. RULES,

supra note 6.

24. BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 701(6); see id. 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d). In extraordinary circumstances, temporary ex parte relief was available under Rules 10-601(d), I I44(e), and 12-43(e). See id. 10-601(d), 11-44(e), 12-43(e).
25. Id. 703.
26. Id. 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d).
27. In re Laufer, 230 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1956); In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d
941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935); In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
28. Continental Mortgage Co. v. Bric of America, Inc. (In re Bric of America, Inc.), 4
COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 34, 39 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. Feb. 3, 1975); Northwestern Fin. Investors v. O.K. Motels (In re O.K. Motels), I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 416, 419-20 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. June 19, 1974); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.0113] (15th ed. 1981) (cases
cited therein); Anderson, Secured Creditors: Theirs Rights and Remedies Under Chapter XI
of the Bankruptcy Act, 81 CoM. L.J. 129, 134 (1976); Kennedy, The Automatic Stay In
Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 175, 238-45 (1978); Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW.
15, 31 (1974); Seidman, The Plight of the Secured Creditors in Chapter XI, 80 CoM. L.J.
343, 346 (1975).
29. In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 805 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981); In re 5Leaf Clover Corp., 6 Bankr. 463, 466 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980). Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, does proffer three nonexclusive methods of providing adequate protection to an entity with an interest in property of the debtor. I1 U.S.C. § 361.
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ion": 30 the difference between the outstanding debt and the value of
the collateral. Where the value of the collateral substantially exceeds
the value of the outstanding debt, a cushion is said to exist, ade-

quately protecting the creditor. Where the cushion is slight and
likely to be dissipated, or is absent altogether, the courts are inclined
to find that the creditor is not adequately protected and may lift the
stay, allowing foreclosure upon property which may be vital to a successful reorganization.
Application of an equity cushion analysis in determining
whether to grant relief from the stay is an unwarranted departure
from the approach developed under the Bankruptcy Act. The equity
cushion analysis has no basis in the historical development of stay
litigation, 31 is inconsistent with the congressional intent that each
case be judged on its own facts,3 2 and has the effect of working arbi-

trary and unjust results. 3 The similarity in language and purpose of
the stay provisions under the Bankruptcy Act and the new Code is
evident, and there seems to be no sound basis for deviating from the
flexible and equitable approach developed under the Act.
III.

RELIEF CHAPTERS X AND XI UNDER THE ACT, CHAPTER 11
UNDER THE CODE, AND THE RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE

The relief chapters of the bankruptcy laws serve to rehabilitate
debtors for continued and more value-productive participation in the
open credit economy-to provide debtors a meaningful fresh start.3 '
30. In re San Clemente Estates, 5 Bankr. 605, 609 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Tuckcr, 5 Bankr. 180, 182 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Lake Tahoe Land Co., 5 Bankr. 34, 37
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1980); In re Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr. 679, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980);
see In re Hutton-Johnson Co., 6 Bankr. 855 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re 5-Leaf Clover
Corp., 6 Bankr. 463 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Shockley Forest Indus., 5 Bankr. 160
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Pitts, 2 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979) (Chapter 13 case).
31. See In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 810-12 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
32. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 339, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6295.
33. See infra notes 273-318 and accompanying text.
34. Report Of The Commission On The Bankruptcy Laws Of The United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., Ist. Sess., Pt. I, at 84 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commission
Report I].
The term 'open credit economy' refers to the role of private credit generally in the
economy . . .[and involves] a complex of highly organized processes. They are
commonly identifiable as the producers of transactions in which financial institutions
extend credit according to contractual terms binding future payment. [These
processes] may be distinguished according to the different [although overlapping]
creditors, debtors, and intermediaries who participate; the different objectives of
credit extension; the different institutional arrangements in which the transactions
arise; and the different methods and procedures of contractual creation, perform-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss4/8

6

Dash: The Equity Cushion Analysis in Bankruptcy
1982]

EQUITY CUSHION ANALYSIS

The policy favoring debtor rehabilitation encourages distressed businesses to restructure finances so that they may continue to operate,
provide jobs, pay creditors, and produce a return for investors and
owners.3 5 The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that
are used for production in the industry for which they were designed
are more valuable than those same assets liquidated at forced sale
prices."6 "As a principle of national economy, preservation of a business is preferred to its liquidation." 8
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197838 is an attempt by Congress to adapt the law of bankruptcy to the realities of the credit
economy.39 Chapter 11,40 "which deals with the reorganization of a
financially distressed business enterprise, providing for its rehabilitation by adjustment of its debt obligations and equity interests,"'41 replaces the business rehabilitation Chapters X, XI, and XII of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.42 The goal of these provisions is to rehabilitate the debtor's finances and avoid liquidation of assets.48 Chapter
11 of the Code synthesizes Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bankance, and enforcement.
Id. at 81-82.
Many court opinions have given expression to the recognition of a congressional purpose
to afford a debtor in financial distress a fair opportunity to rehabilitate his enterprise under the
protection and with the assistance of the court. See, e.g., In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367,
369 (2d Cir. 1971) (referring to "the Congressional mandate to encourage attempts at corporate reorganization where there is a reasonable possibility of success"); C.I. Mortgage Group
v. Nevada Assocs. (In re Nevada Towers Assocs.), 14 COLUER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 146, 149
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1977) (court speaks of "the national legislature's grand design for
insolvencies"). The Nevada Towers court emphasized that the purpose of a Chapter XII case,
"unlike the ordinary bankruptcy, is rehabilitation of the debtor and not liquidation of its assets." Id. at 151.
35. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 220, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6179.
36. Carlton Indus., Inc. v. Philadelphia Import Center, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
1312, 1314 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 1976); H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 220, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6179; see Kennedy, supra note 28, at 252.
37. Carlton Indus., Inc. v. Philadelphia Import Center, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
1312, 1314 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 1976).
38. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. III 1979).
39. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 5966.
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.
41. S. REP., supra note 10, at 9, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5795.
42. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Act of Jun. 22,
1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101151326 (Supp. III 1979).
43. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 220-23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6179-83.
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ruptcy Act and greatly improves the chances for successful and efficient reorganizations by providing a flexible scheme that can be tailored to fit the needs and circumstances of each debtor.
A.

Chapters X and XI Under the Act
ChapterX

The procedure under the Bankruptcy Act was relatively simple
and the basic principles were the same for all rehabilitation chapters.
When a petition was filed with the court all creditor actions against
the debtor were stayed." The stay gave the debtor the opportunity to
bring all of its creditors together for discussion, explanation of the
debtor's financial problems, and negotiation. Creditors were prevented from unilaterally acting to gain an advantage over other creditors or to pressure the debtor into action.
Chapter X was essentially a remedial statute, designed to effect
the rehabilitation of corporate debtors. It attempted to conserve the
going-concern values of property, avoid foreclosures and forced sales,
and enable the debtor to continue operations.45 Ordinary bankruptcy
liquidation was not contemplated in Chapter X, except upon failure
of the reorganization plan.46
The reorganization proceeding's purpose was to formulate and
confirm a plan of reorganization.47 The plan would determine how
much creditors would be paid and whether such payment would be
made in cash, property, or securities; what interest, if-any, stockholders would retain in the company; and what structure the business
would maintain in continuing operations.48
A salient and principal feature of a Chapter X reorganization
was that both secured and unsecured debt, as well as the interests of
stockholders, could be adjusted or modified. 49 The reorganization
machinery was set in motion by the filing of a petition, 50 either by
44. BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-601(a), 11-44(a), 12-43(a).
45. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); Oglesby & Simpson Supply Co. v. Duggan, 174 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1949).
46. Fidelity Assurance Assoc. v. Sims., 318 U.S. 608, 622 (1943); see Oglesby & Simpson Supply Co. v. Duggan, 174 F.2d 904, 906 (8th Cir. 1949).
47. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 221, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 6180. See 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 10.02, at 10 (14th ed. 1977).
48. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 221, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 6180.
49. Bankruptcy Act § 216(1). See 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 10.03 (14th ed.
1977).
50. Bankruptcy Act § 126; Bankr. Rules 10-101. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
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the debtor 51 or by three or more creditors holding claims of a specified nature and amount. 52 Chapter X was primarily for the reorganization of large publicly held corporations, particularly those needing
a readjustment of their secured debts.53
Chapter X prescribed that certain requisites be contained in the
petition filed with the court.54 In addition, all petitions were subject
to dismissal if not filed in "good faith."55 The court in which a voluntary petition for reorganization was filed would enter an order approving the petition, if satisfied that it complied with the requirements of the chapter and that it was filed in good faith.56 Once the
petition was approved, the court was required to appoint one or more
disinterested trustees5'7 if the indebtedness, liquidated as to amount
and not contingent as to liability, exceeded $250,000.58 If the indebtedness was less than $250,000, the court could appoint trustees or
allow the debtor to remain in possession of the business and continue
operations.59
Once the reorganization process commenced, the disinterested
trustee became the key figure. Because rehabilitation of the debtor
was envisioned, the trustee was granted rights and powers enabling
him to act on the premises,60 and was generally authorized to oper4.03 (14th ed. 1978).
51. Bankruptcy Act § 126; Bankr. Rules 10-101. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1
4.05 (14th ed. 1978).
52. Bankruptcy Act § 126; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-101, -105; see 6 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 1 4.03, .05-.07 (14th ed. 1978).
53. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); 6 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY %0.1211] (14th ed. 1978). Small corporations could be reorganized under Chapter X if a readjustment of secured debt was necessary. Id.
54. Bankruptcy Act §§ 130-131. For a discussion of these elements, see 6 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY
4.14, 4.16 (14th ed. 1978). For a discussion of the formal requisites of all
reorganization petitions, see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7 4.13 (14th ed. 1978).
55. Bankruptcy Act §§ 141, 146; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-113 (a), (b). For a
discussion of the good faith requirement of petitions, see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 6.07.08 (14th ed. 1978).
56. Bankruptcy Act § 141; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-113. Under Rule 10113(a), if the court was not satisfied that the petition complied with the requirements of the
chapter and good faith it "shall enter an order permitting the petition to be amended or dismissing the case." Id. 10-113(a). For a general discussion of the approval or dismissal of a
debtor's petition under § 141 and Rule 10-113, see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY %6.02 (14th
ed. 1978).
57. Bankruptcy Act § 158; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-202(c)(2); see 6 COLUER
ON BANKRUPTCY 7 7.08 (14th ed. 1978).
58. Bankruptcy Act § 156; BANKR.RULES, supra note 6, 10-202(a); see 6 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 7 7.02

(14th ed. 1978).

59. Bankruptcy Act § 156;

BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-202(a).
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11

60. Bankruptcy Act §§ 186-187; see 6
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ate the debtor's business.61 It was, in addition, incumbent upon the
trustee to perform the important task of assembling and formulating
a plan of reorganization for submission to the court.6 2 In circumstances where a trustee was not appointed and the debtor continued
in possession of the business, Chapter X granted the debtor the
rights and powers of a trustee 3 and permitted either the debtor or
any creditor to submit a plan."
Chapter X prescribed provisions required of every reorganization plan, 65 as well as certain optional provisions which a plan could
contain if desirable in a particular case. 6 This provided needed flexibility while simultaneously insuring that every plan would meet a
minimum standard. Within these bounds, the actual terms of a plan
would respond to the specific circumstances of the debtor and the
financial difficulties to be overcome.
In order for a plan to be approved, the court had to conclude
that the statutory requisites of the Act had been complied with and
that the plan was "fair and equitable, and feasible. ' '6 7 After ap-

proval, the court would submit the plan to creditors and stockholders
for acceptance or rejection. 8 Once the plan was accepted by or on
behalf of creditors holding two-thirds in amount of claims of each
class affected by the plan and similarly accepted by a majority of
each remaining class affected, the plan became subject to confirmation by the court."
The court would confirm the plan if satisfied that the proposal
1978).
61.

Bankruptcy Act § 189; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-207; see 6 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 7 8.12 (14th ed. 1978).
62. Bankruptcy Act §§ 167, 169; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-301(c)(1); see 6
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7 7.31 (14th ed. 1978).
63. Bankruptcy Act § 188; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-207, 10-208(b); see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 8.10, 8.12 (14th ed. 1978).
64. Bankruptcy Act § 170; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-301(c)(2); see 6 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 7 7.34 (14th ed. 1978).
65. Bankruptcy Act § 216(1), (3), (5)-(8), (10)-(12); see 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
10.03, 10.05, 10.09-.12, 10.19-.21 (14th ed. 1977).
66. Bankruptcy Act § 216(2), (4), (9), (13), (14); see 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11
10.04, 10.08, 10.18, 10.22-.23 (14th ed. 1977).
67. Bankruptcy Act § 174; see 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 11.04-.07 (14th ed.
1977).
68. Bankruptcy Act § 174; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-303(d).
69. Bankruptcy Act § 179; see BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-303(d), 10-305. For an
in-depth discussion of proof and allowance of claims and interests in reorganization cases, see
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 119.02-.09 (14th ed. 1978). For a discussion of the court's classification of claims and interests, see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 9.10-.15 (14th ed. 1978).
1
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and acceptance were in good faith, that the plan was "fair and equitable, and feasible," and otherwise complied with the statutory requirements.70 Following confirmation, the steps specified in Chapter
X for consummation of the plan and distribution thereunder would
commence. 71 Upon consummation the court would enter a decree
closing the estate.72
Chapter XI
Chapter X was intended for the reorganization of corporations
with public debt or with security holders whose rights would be adversely affected by the proposed reorganization plan. 8 Chapter XI,
on the other hand, was designed to permit an individual, a partnership, or a corporate debtor to negotiate a common law extension or
composition plan with unsecured creditors. 4 Only the debtor had the
right to file for relief under Chapter XI,7 5 and the debtor also had
the exclusive right to file a plan.7 6
Unlike Chapter X, the rights of equity interests and secured
creditors could not be affected under a Chapter XI plan without
their consent.77 Chapter XI, however, offered simplicity and greater
flexibility and eliminated the complex procedural elements intended
to protect the interests of public creditors and security holders in a
reorganization case.7 8 A trustee was appointed in very limited circumstances, and the debtor generally remained in possession of the
collateral and operated the business under court supervision.79 In
70. Bankruptcy Act § 221. For an extended discussion regarding confirmation of a plan,
see 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7 11.02-.10 (14th ed. 1977).
71.

Bankruptcy Act §§ 224(3), (4), 227; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-309(a), 10-

405. For a discussion of the effect and consequences of confirmation, see 6A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 11 11.13-.16 (14th ed. 1977).
72. Bankruptcy Act § 228; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-309(b). For a discussion of
the final decree, see 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 11.17-.21 (14th ed. 1977).
73. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 447 (1940); see
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); In re Continental Inv. Corp., 586
F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1978).

74.

See supra note 73; Commission Report I, supra note 34, at 240. Composition or

extension plans were called general plans of arrangement; arrangement was defined in Chapter

XI as "any plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension of the time of payment of his unsecured debts, upon any terms." Bankruptcy Act § 306(1).
75. Bankruptcy Act § 306(5).
76. Bankruptcy Act § 306(1).
77. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); Bankruptcy Act §§
306(1), 307, 356, 357(1).
78.

See supra note 73.

79. Bankruptcy Act § 342.
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short, formulation of the reorganization plan and "indeed the entire
Chapter XI proceeding, for all practical purposes [was] in the hands
of the debtor, subject only to the requisite consent of a majority in
number and amount of unsecured creditors . . . and the ultimate
finding by the court that the plan [was] .
'for the best interests of
the creditors.' "80
B.

Chapter 11 Under The Bankruptcy Code

With the enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code, the business
reorganization chapters under the Bankruptcy Act have been consolidated into one new chapter-Chapter 11. Chapter 11 under the
Code combines the need for expeditious, effective reorganization
found in Chapter XI of the Act with many of the protections for
public investors contained in Chapter X of the Act. 81
A Chapter 11 case is commenced either by a voluntary petition
filed by the debtor 82 or an involuntary petition filed by a certain
number of creditors with a specified amount of claims.83 The commencement of a voluntary case constitutes an automatic order for
relief,84 and appropriate notioe. of such, an order is required.8 Chapter 11 embodies a policy that'a debtor will be permitted to operate
its business as a debtor in possession86 after entry of an order for
relief, unless it can be established that cause exists for the appointment of a trustee.87 The debtor in possession has the exclusive right
to negotiate a plan of reorganization with creditors and equity interests for 120 days after the filing of the petition or for such period as
the court deems appropriate." Thereafter, the debtor no longer retains this exclusive franchise unless the requisite acceptances of the
80. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 605-06 (1965) (quoting Bankruptcy Act §§ 362, 366).
For a historical perspective of Chapters X and XI, their origin, and their basic differences,
see Commission Report I, supra note 34, at 237-48.
81. For a discussion of some of the basic differences and similarities between Chapter 11
of the 1978 Code and Chapters X and XI of the Act, see King, Chapter 11 of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107 (1979).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 301.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 303.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 301.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 342.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(l)(definition of debtor in possession under Chapter 11).
87. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1107-1108; 5 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY
1108.01.03 (15th ed. 1981); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (trustee shall be appointed "if such
appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of
the estate").
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (d).
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plan have been obtained within 180 days of the filing of the petition
or for such period as the court deems appropriate.89
A Chapter 11 plan may modify the rights of any class of creditors or equity security holders9" and may be confirmed notwithstanding the opposition of one or more classes of creditors or equity interests. 91 This is not to say that the Code places no restrictions on the
treatment of creditors and stockholders or leaves them unprotected.
If the holder of a claim or interest has not accepted the plan the
court cannot confirm it, unless the plan provides that such holder
will receive or retain at least what would have been received if the
debtor was liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Code. 1 In addition, a
plan cannot be confirmed if the court determines that the plan is
likely to be followed by liquidation or the need for further financial
reorganization, unless liquidation or further reorganization is contemplated by the terms of the plan.93
The Bankruptcy Code provides that classes of creditors whose
claims are not impaired by the plan are deemed to accept the plan."
A claim is considered impaired by a plan if it does not provide for
full payment in cash on the consummation date or does not provide
for payment according to the original terms of the contract.95
Where the plan impairs a class of claims the proponent of the
plan must procure acceptances from two-thirds in amount and more
than one-half in number of such class.96 Where a class of equity interests are impaired, acceptances are required from two-thirds in
amount of the class. 97 If the proponent acquires the requisite acceptances and complies with the other enumerated requirements, the
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c), (d).
90. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129, 1141; 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1123.01[1]-[3],
1123.02[1], 1129.03 (15th ed. 1981).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b). See Klee, All You Ever Wanted To Know About Cram Down
Under the New Bankruptcy Code. 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
429.03[3]-[4] (15th ed. 1981).
92. 11 U.S.C. § I129(a)(7). See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11129.02[7] (15th ed.
1981).
93. 11 U.S.C. § I129(a)(11). This section embodies what is considered the feasibility
standards for a plan of reorganization. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.02[11] (15th
ed. 1981).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(0. Any class denied participation under a plan in the sense that
the plan does not provide for any distribution to that class is deemed to have rejected the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(g).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 1124. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1124.01-.03 (15th ed. 1981).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(d).
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court will confirm the plan. 98 Upon confirmation virtually all claims
against a Chapter 11 debtor are discharged. 99
The provisions of Chapter 11 may at times assist a debtor in
avoiding a Chapter 11 proceeding. Dissident unsecured creditors
should be aware that their rights may be modified under a plan if
the required majority approves it. Intransigent secured creditors involved in out-of-court negotiations should be aware that the amount
of their secured claim will be determined on the basis of the court's
assessment of the value of the collateral. 100 Moreover, the secured
creditor should also be cognizant of the fact that a plan of reorganization can be confirmed notwithstanding objection if the plan provides for deferred payment of the present value of the creditor's
claim.101
C.

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

In 1964 the Supreme Court was granted the authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for cases under the Bankruptcy Act, 02 comparable to the existing rulemaking power in the
areas of civil, criminal, and admiralty practice.20 3 This grant of authority was a response to Congress' inattentiveness to bankruptcy administration.' ° The Bankruptcy Act contained numerous procedural
provisions and as court practice evolved, Congress did not amend the
law to keep pace with this evolution. Instead, Congress entrusted the
modernization of bankruptcy procedure to the Supreme Court.
The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, designed to govern all procedural aspects of a bankruptcy case, 0 5 were first promulgated in
1973 and were completed for all chapters of the Act in 1976.106 The
Rules, if not expressly rejected by Congress prior to their effective
date, supercede all conflicting statutory provisions, subject only to
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1129.02 (15th ed. 1981).
For a discussion of confirmation notwithstanding failure of impaired class to accept the plan,
see Klee, supra note 91, at 140; 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1129.03 (15th ed. 1981).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c). But see 11 U.S.C. § 523 (exceptions to discharge).
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
101. See supra note 91.
102. Pub. L. No. 88-623, 78 Stat. 1001 (1964) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976)).
103. See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5 (14th ed. 1973).
104. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 292, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws at 6249.

105. Herzog, The Impact of the Proposed Bankruptcy Rules on the Court, 45 AM.
L.J. 363, 363 (1971).
106. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 292, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6249.
BANKR.
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the limitation that they neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify any
substantive right.107 It is entirely possible, and in many instances
likely, that the adoption of a rule may not modify the language of a
statutory provision, but the statute's application thereafter may be
affected to some degree.10° It is therefore necessary to read the Rules
in conjunction with the concomitant statutory provision in order to
understand the relationship of the rule to the statute and to determine the extent to which that provision has been affected.
The advent of the Bankruptcy Code substantially affects the
role of the Supreme Court. The Court retains rulemaking authority
so that it may continue to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for bankruptcy cases; the new law, however, repeals the provision that permits rules to annul statutory law with which they conflict.10 9 The new law contains a minimum of procedural matter, thus
affording the Court great flexibility in promulgating rules of practice
since there are few statutory provisions with which such rules could
conflict.110 Until the Court promulgates new rules, the existing ones
remain applicable to the extent they are not inconsistent with the
new law.1 '

IV.

RELIEF FROM THE STAY IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ACT

It is well recognized that the bankruptcy court is a court of equity and that bankruptcy proceedings are essentially equitable in nature. 2 Moreover, it is accepted that the application of a secured
creditor for permission to reclaim its collateral raises an issue touching upon the discretion of the court11 s and that in the exercise of this
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (Supp. 11 1978).
108. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 (14th ed. 1973).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976), amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2672 (1978).
110. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 292-93, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6249-50.
111. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2549,
2685 (1978). Pursuant to 405(d), the rules in effect on September 30, 1979 continue to apply,

unless inconsistent with the new law, until repealed or superceded by new rules. Id.
112. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co.,
294 U.S. 648, 675-76 (1935); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended
by Act of Jun. 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 2(a), 52 Stat. 840, 842. See Bank of Matin v. Eng., 385
U.S. 99 (1966). Mr. Justice Douglas stated: "There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction." Id. at 103.
113. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co.,
294 U.S. 648, 677 (1935); In re Laufer, 230 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1956); In re Murel
Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935).
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discretion the court is to be guided by equitable considerations.11 '
Case law concerning the restraint of creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings has been shaped by controversies where the property
rights of the creditor are pitted against human concerns such as a
continuation of business, loss of employment, and the impact on the
local economy. The court must attempt to foster rehabilitation without inequitably depriving the secured creditor of his right to repayment. Courts, mindful of debtors' and creditors' competing interests
"are conscious of the deep concern of the. . . secured creditors lest
their security depreciate beyond adequate salvage, but . . . must

balance that with the Congressional mandate to encourage attempts
at corporate reorganization where there is a reasonable possibility of
success." 11 5 Implicitly described in this statement is the balancing
process used to weigh the "need to rehabilitate debtors against the
need both to preserve the integrity of previous transactions between
the debtor and his creditors and to determine the extent to which
creditors should be forced to surrender their rights to assist the
debtor in the process of rehabilitation.' 1 6
The fate of debtors under the relief chapters of the Act was
often determined by decisions as to which party would have control
or use of the collateral during the proceeding. 17 The continued use
of the assets subject to the creditors' security interests was usually
necessary if the debtor was to remain in operation long enough after
the petition had been filed to reorganize or propose a plan of
arrangement.
The discretionary decisions regarding control of collateral which
a court could interpose between a debtor and a secured creditor
114. Bank of Manin v. Eng., 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966); Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express
Sys. (In re Yale Express Sys., Inc.), 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966); see Continental Ill. Nat'!
Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 675-77 (1935);
Festersen, supra note 4.
115. In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971).
116. Murphy, Use of Collateralin Business Rehabilitations:A Suggested Redrafting of
Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (1975).
The question of restraining secured creditors presupposes, of course, that the security interest is valid. It is also axiomatic that the secured creditor's interest is, generally, in reclaiming its collateral as soon as possible, unless circumstances permit maximization of recovery by assisting in rehabilitation. For instance, secured creditors with a lower priority than
other secured creditors may have an interest which coincides with the debtor's, if their only
hope for recovery is debtor rehabilitation facilitated by the use of the collateral. See Note, Use
of Secured Creditors' Collateralin ChapterX Reorganizations: A Proposed Modification of
the Commission's and Judges' Bills, 1 J. CORP. L., 555, 569 (1976).
117. Webster, CollateralControl Decisions in Chapter Cases: ClearRules v. Judicial
Discretion, 51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 197 (1977). See supra note 13.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss4/8

16

Dash: The Equity Cushion Analysis in Bankruptcy
19821

EQUITY CUSHION ANALYSIS

arose primarily from the automatic stay provisions. 118 These provisions were vague as to how the court's power was to be exercised.
The stay rules initially placed the burden on the creditor to seek and
show cause for relief, which could take the form of termination, an-

nulment, modification, or conditioning of the stay. 11 ' Once the credi-

tor had shown cause, the burden shifted to the debtor to show that
1 20
he was entitled to continuation of the stay.
In determining whether to grant relief from the stay, the courts
overcame the vagueness of the Rules and generally considered four
issues relevant to an application for relief: the likelihood of a suc-

cessful reorganization, 2 ' the property's importance to the debtor's

operations,122 the likelihood of material harm to the secured creditor, 2 and the debtor's equity in the collateral.12 4 These four consid-

erations were given varying degrees of significance in the balancing
process according to the particular facts and circumstances of the

case. 2 5 A balancing process, by nature, does not require the finding
of a predetermined level for each factor considered." 6 A court,

therefore, could accord each consideration a specific quantum of significance when assessing the aggregate of considerations. 1 While
there were no standardized criteria for the exercise of a judgment by

a court, the basis of the judgment was expected to bear a rational
relationship to the point of the proceedings, the nature of the inter-

ests to be protected, and the overall salutary purpose of the relief
118. Bankruptcy Act §§ 11(a), 113, 116(4), 148, 314, 414, 428; BANKR. RULES, supra
note 6, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43.
119. BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d); see Kennedy, supra
note 28, at 226-27. "[T]he secured creditor's complaint [had to] frame the issues applicable in
the case and establish all essential elements of a claim for relief from an automatic stay."
Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at 1225.
120. BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d); see C.I. Mortgage
Group v. Nevada Assocs. (In re Nevada Towers Assocs.), 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB)
146, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1977); Kennedy, supra note 28, at 226-27.
The bankruptcy rules concerning ex parte relief were slightly more illuminating, providing
the creditor relief from the stay if he could present specific facts showing that he would suffer
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage. BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-601(d),
11-44(e), 12-43(e).
121. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 161-212 and accompanying text.
125. Kennedy, supra note 28, at 239; see, e.g., In re Georgetown on Del., Inc., 466 F.2d
80 (3d Cir. 1972); see Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at 1225-26, 1230; Webster, supra
note 117, at 222-23.
126. Webster, supra note 117, at 222-23.
127. Id.
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chapters. 128
A.

Likelihood of a Successful Rehabilitation

In order to approve a petition filed under Chapter X of the Act,
the court must find that the petition was filed in good faith.12 A
petition is not filed in good faith if "it is unreasonable to expect that
a plan of reorganization can be effected." 130 Before an approved plan
of reorganization can be confirmed under Chapter X, the court must
find it to be feasible. 131 The standard of feasibility is generally
viewed by the courts as equivalent to the likelihood of successful reorganization. 2 Moreover, the court must be satisfied at the time of
confirmation that "the proposal of the plan and its acceptance are in
good faith. '13 3 A plan proffered without any realistic hope for success would not be proposed in good faith.'u Accordingly, a court
considering the likelihood of a successful reorganization must not assist a debtor, by giving him control of the collateral to the detriment
of the secured creditor, if the debtor is undoubtedly going to be
liquidated. 5
The degree of likelihood of a successful rehabilitation required
to justify continuation of a stay during a bankruptcy proceeding has
been variously articulated. The typical formulation in a case denying
relief from a stay is that reorganization appears to be a "reasonable
possibility. '13 6 Bankruptcy Judge Babitt of the Southern District of
New York, in a recent Chapter XII case, denied relief from a stay in
view of evidence that "it is as reasonably likely that the debtor will
128. C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mountain Corp. (In re Groundhog Mountain
Corp.), 4 COLLIER

129.

BANKR.

CAS. (MB) 387, 392 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1975).

Bankruptcy Act § 141 (voluntary petition), § 142 (involuntary petition); BANKR.

RULES, supra note 6, 10-113(a), (b).

130. Bankruptcy Act § 146(3).
131. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2).
132. See 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 111.07, at 235-42 (14th ed. 1977); King, Feasi-

bility in ChapterX Reorganizations, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 323, 325-26 (1975). King states
that feasibility requires the court to be "assured that there is reasonable potential for success."
Id. at 326.
133. Bankruptcy Act § 221(3).
134. See 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 11.08 (14th ed. 1977).
135. Webster, supra note 117, at 227. See 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1111.07 (14th
ed. 1977) (discussing feasibility requirement for a plan of reorganization).
136. BVA Credit Corp. v. Consolidated Motor Inns (In re Consolidated Motor Inns), 6
COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 18, 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 1975); cf. In re Empire Steel
Co., 228 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D. Utah 1964) (where stay granted under Bankruptcy Act § 314
was directed to be terminated unless incident to a "plan susceptible of reasonably prompt
processing.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss4/8

18

Dash: The Equity Cushion Analysis in Bankruptcy
19821

EQUITY CUSHION ANALYSIS

successfully rehabilitate as not. 137 The typical rationale when relief
from a stay is granted is that reorganization is not a "realistic
138
expectation.1
Any assessment of the likelihood of a successful reorganization
requires the court to speculate on the probable outcome of a complicated and uncertain process. A stark appraisal of relevant experience
probably warrants adoption by the courts of a strong presumption
against the likelihood of success of any reorganization.1 3 "Notwithstanding the burden of justification imposed on the party seeking
continuation of the stay, the bankruptcy courts have understandably
been reluctant to terminate a stay at an early stage of the reorganization process solely on a finding that reorganization is . . . unlikely.

'140

Especially in Chapter X cases, where the original petition

must be filed in "good faith"141 and is subject to dismissal if "it is
unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected, 14 2 courts are hesitant to conclude at the outset that the proceedings are destined to fail. The courts will usually give the debtor

a reasonable time to work out an eligible rehabilitative plan before
determining that the proceedings are not likely to succeed.1 43

137. C.I. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Assocs. (In re Nevada Towers Assocs.), 14 COL(MB) 146, 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1977). The court also noted that
at an early stage in the proceedings, "it is not necessary that the debtor prove to a high degree
of certainty that it will successfully rehabilitate itself." Id.
138. E.g., Pledger v. Red Carpet Corp. (In re The Red Carpet Corp.), 11 COLWER
BANKR. CAS. (MB) 487, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 1976); Northwestern Fin. Investors
v. O.K. Motels (In re O.K. Motels), I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 416, 420 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. June 19, 1974). A number of opinions emphasize the speculative or visionary character of
the debtor's possibilities for reorganization. See, e.g., C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog
LIER BANKR. CAS.

Mountain Corp. (In re Groundhog Mountain Corp.), 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 387, 394

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1975); National Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp. (In re Jenifer
Mall Corp.), 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 657, 664 (Bankr. D. D.C. Oct. 31, 1974); see also
6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 111.08, at 243 (14th ed. 1977)(a plan advancing a visionary or

impractical scheme of reorganization as to be impossible of consummation is lacking good
faith).
139. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PRocEss, REFORM 140,
145-46 (1971).
140. Kennedy, supra note 28, at 242; see Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust
v. Bergman (In re Bernard Bergman), 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 222, 228-29 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1977), aO'd, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1313 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1978); 6A
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

11.07 (14th ed. 1977); Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at

1231.
141. See supra note 55.
142. Bankruptcy Act § 146(3).
143. The range of time between the debtor's filing of a petition and the bankruptcy
court's order allowing relief from the stay is quite varied. See, e.g., Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Seres.
Inc., 422 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1970) (five months); First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n. v. Holiday
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This judicial reluctance, however, affords little consolation to a
lienor whose security suffers continuing deterioration during the pendency of the stay. In most cases, disposition of a complaint seeking
relief from the stay will require a consideration of other issues.
B. Essentiality of the Encumbered Property

It has been suggested that a bankruptcy court in rehabilitation
proceedings will exercise its equitable powers in favor of debtors in
order to promote the desired end of rehabilitation.4 The courts,
however, are not so slanted and are both sensitive and responsive to
the respective interests involved. Courts have often relieved secured
creditors of the burden of a stay where it appeared that the encumbered property was not essential to rehabilitation of the debtor's
business. 45
Essentiality may be found not only when the property is indispensable to the reorganized enterprise 46 but also when it is required
to enable the debtor to operate its business during the pendency of
the case in the bankruptcy court. 47 "In the absence of a demonLodge, Inc. (In re Holiday Lodge, Inc.), 300 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1962)(thirteen months); In re
Hartsdale Assocs., 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1976)(nine
months); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mountain Corp. (In re Groundhog Mountain
Corp.), 4 COLUER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 387 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1975)(nine months).
144. Festersen, supra note 4, at 317-18.
145. See, e.g., In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (in Chapter XI
proceeding, district court reversed bankruptcy court's stay of foreclosure on debtor's home
because residence was not of "essential necessity" in operation of debtor's business); see also
National Bank v. Goodwin, 12 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 493 (Bankr. D. Md. May 3,
1977) (secured creditors allowed to foreclose on debtor's stock because Chapter XI plan was
already accepted and confirmed and such a plan cannot modify or alter secured creditors'
rights); Pledger v. Red Carpet Corp. (In re The Red Carpet Corp.), 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS.
(MB) 487 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 1976)(mortgaged cottage used by debtor and family not
necessary to operation of Chapter XI debtor's restaurant, lounge, and motel business; fact that
debtor admitted that plan amounted to nothing more than orderly liquidation outside of ordinary bankruptcy proceeding weighed heavily in secured creditor's favor).
146. See, e.g., BVA Credit Corp. v. Consolidated Motor Inns (In re Consolidated Motor
Inns), 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 18, 32 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 1975)(petition for
reclamation of leased equipment denied; property found "absolutely essential to. . .reorganization or the prospect thereof"); In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961)(district court
reversed bankruptcy court's stay of foreclosure on debtor's home because residence was not of
essential necessity in operation of debtor's business); In re Atlantic Steel Prods. Corp., 31 F.
Supp. 408, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (foreclosure of mortgage on debtor's plant and equipment
enjoined pursuant to § 314 since foreclosure would have rendered impossible carrying out of
plan).
147. Any significant interruption of business during the effort to develop a reorganization is almost certain to be fatal to the effort. Thus, repossession of a substantial portion of
inventory of a merchant or manufacturer by a secured creditor could destroy any prospect of
rehabilitation, even though the particular inventory is not expected to be part of the property
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strated need of the property for the purposes of the reorganization or
rehabilitation, the proponent of the.

. .

stay cannot sustain the bur-

den of justifying interference with the lienor's right to enforce his
lien. 148 Moreover, when hope of rehabilitation is dismal or the stay
threatens injury to the lienor's security, indispensability of the property to the debtor's survival and a mere hope14of rehabilitation are
not enough to justify continuation of the stay. '
It is not often that a court must decide whether the essentiality
requirement applies to the debtor's business. In most rehabilitation
proceedings the two are synonymous, Tlic essentiality requirement is
almost always satisfied. Presumably, this is because the debtor would
probably not litigate the issue if he did not believe control of the
collateral was essential to a successful rehabilitation. Hence, the
court may look to other considerations in determining whether to
grant relief from the stay.
C.

PotentialInjury To The Secured Creditor

The question of whether continuation of the stay will cause undue harm to the secured creditor is so closely related to the issue of
debtor equity in the collateral 50 that the two are often collapsed into
one. Courts often assume that where there is excess collateral for a
secured debt, the creditor cannot complain of a stay of foreclosure;151 and, on the contrary, where the secured debt exceeds the
value of the collateral, the secured creditor will always be harmed by
the stay. 12 Neither assumption is always justified. Even where there
is substantial value in the collateral in excess of the secured debt, the
creditor suffers harm if the interest on the debt accrues or the collatof the reorganized enterprise. See, e.g., In re Creed Bros. Inc., 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB)
426, 429, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1977)(pledged inventory of lumber and building
materials essential to continuance of business and formulation of plan).
148. Kennedy, supra note 28, at 74+45.
149. See, e.g., National Life Ins. Co. v:Jenif' hk-tCorp. (In re Jenifer Mall Corp.), 2
COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 657, 663 (Bankr. D. D.C. Oct. 31, 1974); Northwestern Fin.
Investors v. O.K. Motels (In re O.K. Motels), 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. (MB) 416, 420 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. June 19, 1974); In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1964).
150. See infra notes 161-81 and accompanying text.
151. See Silver Gate Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Carlson (In re Victor Builders, Inc.), 418
F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1969); Citicorp Business Credit, Inc. v. Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc. (In
re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.), 407 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio 1976); In re Atlantic Steel
Prods. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
152. In re DLB Dev. Corp., 1 BANKR. Cr. DEc. (CRR) 1463, 1466-67 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1975); see Silver Gate Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Carlson (In re Victor Builders, Inc.), 418
F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1969).
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eral depreciates, thereby dissipating the equity cushion. 153 In addition, the secured creditor is deprived of the use of money, and this
may in turn result in impairment of the creditor's own standing with
financial institutions.'
A secured creditor whose debt exceeds the value of the collateral might not suffer from a stay if the collateral does not depreciate
while in use by the debtor during chapter proceedings. Similarly, a
secured creditor's position would not be jeopardized if the debtor
were able to make payments equal to the amount of depreciation and
accruing interest or to give the secured creditor a lien on additional
property.1 55 Also, suppose that at the time a debtor files the petition
the collateral of a creditor consists mainly of raw materials and work
in progress with negligible liquidation value. The undersecured creditor might indeed benefit if, during the proceedings, the collateral
were to be converted into finished inventory. 58
A court, in assaying a petition for relief, must concurrently consider the rights of the secured creditor 57 and the interests of the
debtor and general creditors. It is essential that the court be sensitive
to and continually aware of the rehabilitative purpose of the pro153. See supra notes 18, 19 and accompanying text.
154. E.g., In re DLB Dev. Corp., 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1463, 1466 (Bankr. S.D.

Cal. Oct. 9, 1975)(secured creditor forced to borrow funds at higher interest rate than that
required on its loan to debtor).
155. These methods of adequate protection were expressly incorporated into the new
bankruptcy law, along with the third method of providing the secured creditor with the indubi-

table equivalent of its interest in the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 361; see infra notes 204-08 and
252-61 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan (In re Waltham Watch Cu.), 185
F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1950) (permitting debtor to assemble inventory into finished goods and to

complete work in progress strengthened net position of secured creditor); C.I. Mortgage Group
v. Nevada Assocs. (In re Nevada Towers Assocs.), 14 COLUER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 146, 155
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1977)(secured creditor argued that stay threatened to add

$780,000 to its deficiency claim, but court anticipated that property could be improved sufficiently during stay to permit full payment of secured debt, whereas termination of stay would
force secured creditor to take property with no prospect for return on its investment).
157. At some point, continuation of the automatic stay may cross the line between mere
postponement of a secured creditor's remedies and erosion of security which amounts to a
taking of property in violation of the fifth amendment. In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp.
316, 319 (D. Utah 1964)("[t]he 'status' of secured creditors then unavoidably would be af-

fected [by prolonged continuation of the stay], for status depends not only upon assurance of
eventual payment but the right to payment or enforcement in point of time bearing some
relationship to the conditions of the security instruments"). Compare In re Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 545 F.2d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1976)("[t]he due process clause of the

[fifth a]mendment is not violated by anything less than actual impairment of a creditor's security") with In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.)(requiring high degree of

likelihood of reorganization within reasonable time), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
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ceeding. The court must balance the harm that the secured creditor
may suffer as a result of the stay against the hardship that the
debtor and general creditors may suffer as a result of foreclosure.'"
This balancing test, traditionally used by equity courts in ruling
on requests for injunctive relief, 159 is appropriate for evaluating continuation of the stay because the stay is in the nature of a temporary
injunction designed to maintain the status quo.16 Implicit in this
balancing process is the consideration of equity in the collateral, an
issue which is often given critical significance in determining
whether to grant relief from the stay.
D.

The Debtor's Equity in the Collateral

Most litigation regarding injunctions and stays of lien enforcement stems from creditors' concern that the stay will injure their
secured position. Determination of that issue as a practical matter,
entails a preliminary determination of the value of the collateral.
When the debtor has substantial equity so that the value of the property substantially exceeds the amount of the debt, some courts have
refused to grant relief from the stay on the theory that the creditor's
position is secure.1 61 A stay of enforcement of a lien, where substantial equity is present, is not likely to jeopardize the position of the
secured creditor. Conversely, when the value of the security is less
162
than the amount of the debt, some courts have vacated the stay,
the absence of equity rendering the issue moot. 16 The absence of
value in the property in excess of the secured debt will make it difficult for the debtor to convince the court that a stay of enforcement
will not injure the secured creditor, 1 " unless the debtor can provide
158.

See supra note 125.

159. 11 C. WRIor & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at
442-43 (1973).
160. In re Decker, 465 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1972).
161. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
162. In re DLB Dee. Corp., 1 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 1463, 1467 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
Oct. 9, 1975); see Silver Gate Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Carlson (In re Victor Builders, Inc.),
418 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1969).
163. In re DLB Corp., 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1463, 1467 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
1975). One court has suggested that it was required to protect a secured creditor where the
debtor's alleged equity in the security was not sufficiently large. See In re Georgetown on Del.,
Inc., 466 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1972). The Chapter X trustee asserted that the debtor's book-value
equity in certain realty was $19,974.50. The court, however, did not find this amount to be
"meaningful" where the debtor's current and long-term liabilities exceeded alleged total assets
by $206,346. Id. at 82-83.
164. See supra note 163. But see supra note 156.
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5

some form of alternative protection.165 The property, unless it is
land, is almost certain to depreciate during the pendency of the stay,
and if the property is used by the debtor during the term of the stay,
the rate of depreciation may be so high as practically to destroy the
value of the collateral.
(i)

Valuation of the Equity in the Collateral

The standard of valuation presents a subsidiary issue that may
assume critical importance in a determination of the presence or absence of equity and the adequacy of protection for the secured creditor subject to the stay. Bankruptcy law envisions at least two standards of valuation: liquidation value, which is the amount realized on
a forced sale of the collateral; 6' and, reorganization value, which is
the amount realizable through a sale in the normal course of business. 167 The difference between these two values accounts for the emphasis in bankruptcy law on reorganization and on continuation of a
debtor's business. The assumption is that liquidation should be
avoided if there is any reasonable likelihood that going-concern value
can be preserved.1 68
A secured creditor, in seeking relief from the stay, is likely to
support his argument by attempting to show the inadequacy of the
collateral to cover his debt and prejudice likely to accrue from a
postponement of foreclosure. The argument may well be predicated
on a valuation of the property at liquidation value rather than on
going-concern value. 6 Since the significant difference between an
unsecured and secured creditor is the latter's ability to realize on
certain property made specifically available for payment of its
165. See supra notes 155, 156; infra notes 204-08, 252-61 and accompanying text.
166. Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at 1237. For the purpose of this article, the
terms forced sale value and liquidation value will be used interchangeably.
167. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525-26 (1941); Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Pembroke Manor Apartments (In re Pembroke Manor Apartments), 547 F.2d 805, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Creed Bros. Inc., 14 COLLIER BANKR.
CAs. (MB) 426, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1977). For the purposes of this article, the
terms fair market value and going concern value will be used interchangeably.
168. See Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Pembroke Manor Apartments (In re Pembroke Manor Apartments), 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977); R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977); In re Bolton Hall
Nursing Home, 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. (MB) 90, 91-92 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 20, 1977);
Carlton Indus., Inc. v. Philadelphia Import Center, 2 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 1312, 1314
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 1976); Klein, H.R. 8200: The Bankruptcy Act Comes of Age, 84
COM. L.J. 8, 10-11 (1979); ProposedNew FederalBankruptcy Act. 32 Bus. LAW. 247, 285-86
(1976)(Mr. Coogan speaking).
169. See, e.g., In re Stevens Enters., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 12, 14 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
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debt, 7 ° it can be argued that liquidation value is appropriate in determining whether the secured creditor should be granted relief from
the stay.
The usual assumption, however, is that the standard to be applied is that of fair market value,171 when the issue is whether property sought to be reclaimed or subjected to foreclosure has any equity. If there is a substantial difference between the forced sale value
and the going-concern value of property subject to a lien, and if the
question of value must be determined at the threshold of the case or
if a successful reorganization appears to be a reasonable prospect,
then the court wisely is likely to avoid reliance on liquidation
value.17 2 It is important to remember that the court possesses great
discretion and wide latitude in determining value and that any determination should be based
on "equitable considerations arising from
' 173
the facts of the case.
Certain types of collateral may militate for or against a particular standard of valuation. 174 "[TIhe nature of the debtor's business,
the prospects for rehabilitation, and the nature of the collateral"17
should all be considered when determining the valuation standard to
be applied. There is no hard and fast rule that will apply in every
case. The infinite number of variations possible in debtor-creditor
dealings, the continuing developments in the law, and the changing
170.

See In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D. Utah 1964).

171. See, e.g., In re Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr. 679, 684 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re
Hosmer, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1 66,778 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 1977)(summary of opin-

ion); In re Sixth Ave. Inv. and Dev. Co., 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1222 (Bankr. 1976); In re
The Overmyer Co., 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 992 (Bankr. 1976); Bank of Virginia Tidewa-

ter v. Porter (In re Porter), 8 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 18, 20 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 27,
1976); In re DLB Dev. Corp., 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1463, 1465 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct.

9, 1975).
172. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Pembroke Manor Apartments (In re Pembroke Manor Apartments), 547 F.2d 805, 807 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Creed Bros. Inc., 14
COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 426, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1977).
A determination and use of liquidation value is inappropriate, in the first instance, be-

cause a rehabilitation proceeding is itself premised on the debtor's continuing operations and
not its liquidation; secondly, use of liquidation value reflects the minimum equity the debtor
has in the property and, concomitantly, the least protection afforded the secured creditor. Such
a finding may impel the court to vacate the stay at an early stage and thwart the purpose of a

reorganization proceeding where use of a different valuation standard would reflect a greater
equity and, in turn, more protection for the secured creditor.
173.

S. REP., supra note 10, at 54, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at

5840.
174. See Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at 1239.

175.

In re Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr. 679, 684 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980)(quoting 2

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 361.02 (15th ed. 1981)).
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modes of financing all point to flexibility in choosing a valuation
standard.17 Use of liquidation value should almost always be
avoided. 1 " Use of a standard based on what might be obtained upon
a sale in the ordinary course of business might also be unadvisable at
times.17 8 The court's approach should be responsive to the rehabilitative purpose of the proceeding and sensitive to the respective interests involved. The standard of valuation, therefore, should be determined on an ad hoc, case by case, basis so that the courts may value
the collateral as the facts and circumstances of a particular situation

warrant.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that in determining the date
on which valuation is to occur, the secured creditor is entitled to no
less than the value of its collateral as of the date of the petition. 17
The bankruptcy court must protect the secured creditor against diminution in value of the collateral during the course of the proceeding

80

when the collateral was retained at the debtor's behest. It is

generally conceded that the value of property subject to a lien may
change during the course of a case, and thus a finding of a particular
value at one stage or for one purpose ought not to preclude a reexamination of the question when circumstances change.1 81
(ii)

Significance of Equity in the Collateral

The absence of equity in the collateral has usually been viewed
as critically significant in a Chapter XI case. 182 This conception has
often been predicated on the bankruptcy court's lack of power to
affect the rights of secured creditors without their consent in a plan
176. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6295.
177. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 174.
179. See In re New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., 147 F.2d 40, 47-48 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 884 (1945); see also supra note 157.
180. See In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 545 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1976); In
re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952); see also supra note 17.
181. See Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at 1240. The authors note that "[w]here
the creditor has sought relief from [the] stay, an increase in collateral value from the date of
the petition to the date of trial would, of course, enlarge the debtor's equity cushion and perhaps make relief from the stay less likely." Id.
182. See, e.g., Silver Gate Say. and Loan Ass'n. v. Carlson (In re Victor Builders, Inc.),
418 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1969). The Silver Gate court upheld remand of the case to the
referee to determine whether there was equity in the property. The court stated that the presence of equity would warrant permanent injunction of mortgage foreclosure utitil a final decree; the absence of equity would require termination of a temporary restraining order under §
314. Id.
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confirmed under Chapter XI.183 The existence of an equity cushion,
however, is not, and should not be, indispensable to the continuation
of a stay."8 ' Bankruptcy courts were explicitly authorized by Con-

gress to enjoin lien enforcement when appropriate to further the objective of rehabilitation under Chapter XI. 185 Where a secured credi-

tor is adequately protected from injury resulting from the stay, the
collateral is essential to rehabilitation, and a reorganization is a realistic possibility, the absence of an equity cushion should be immaterial.18 6 One commentator has even suggested that equity becomes an
issue only if withdrawal of the property from the debtor will affect

the prospects of an arrangement or reorganization that has a reasonable chance of succeeding.
In Chapter X and XII cases under the Bankruptcy Act, a
debtor could adjust or modify a secured creditor's interest 88 and
staying foreclosure was not dependent upon the debtor having substantial equity. 89 One illustrative Chapter X case is FruehaufCorp.
v. Yale Express Sys., Inc.,1 90 which was the last in a series of three

cases dealing with .a secured creditor seeking to reclaim trucks subject to a security interest.19 1 The court in Yale Express affirmed the

district court's denial of the creditor's reclamation petition because
183. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); R.I.D.C. Indus.
Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1976) (the court recognized the validity
of a Chapter XI plan affecting secured creditors with their consent), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1095 (1977); First Southwest Corp. v. Texas Consumer Fin. Corp. (In re Texas Consumer Fin.
Corp.), 480 F.2d 1261, 1265 (5th Cir. 1973); National Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp. (In
re Jenifer Mall Corp.), 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 657, 662-64 (Bankr. D. D.C. Oct. 31,
1974); In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D. Utah 1964).
184. See In re Bolton Hall Nursing Home, 14 COLUER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 90, 92
(Bankr. D. Mass. May 20, 1977) (court observed that Chapters XI and XII were intended for
use of debtors without equity in property); Festersen, supra note 4, at 333; Webster, supra
note 117, at 231-32; see infra notes 213-15, 274-318 and accompanying text.
185. 'See Bankruptcy Act §§ 2a(15), 1 la, 314; BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-601(a).
186. See Festersen, supra note 4, at 333. But see Seidman, supra note 28, at 347.
187. Seidman, supra note 28, at 347.
188. Bankruptcy Act §§ 216(1), 406(1), (2); SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379
U.S. 594 (1965); see 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 110.03 (14th ed. 1977); Kennedy, supra
note 28, at 247-48.
189. See In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971); Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale
Express Sys., Inc. (In re Yale Express Sys., Inc.), 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967); LincolnAlliance Bank & Trust Co. v. Dye, 108 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1939); C.I. Mortgage Group v.
Nevada Assocs. (In re Nevada Towers Assocs.), 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 146 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1977); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Castle Village Co. (In re Castle Village
Co.), 13 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 452 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1977).
190. (In re Yale Express Sys., Inc.), 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967).
191. Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express Sys., Inc. (In re Yale Express Sys., Inc.), 250 F.
Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
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"it [was] clear beyond cavil that the prospects of reorganization
would be frustrated if the reclamation petition were granted. ' 192 The
debtor has little or no equity in the trucks which were depreciating
steadily.19 3 The court of appeals in the second Yale Express case
suggested rental payments to compensate the secured creditor for depreciation,194 but in reviewing the district court's denial of reclamation on remand, the court of appeals found that this would hamper
the reorganization as much as reclamation.1 95 The only protection
afforded the secured creditor was a promise from the court that it
would be given "equitable consideration" in the plan for any loss
occasioned by the depreciation of its collateral.'"
The justification given in Yale Express for the treatment of the
secured creditor was the broad purpose of a reorganization proceeding. The court focused on the essentiality of the collateral to the
debtor's business and the likelihood of successful reorganization "in
light of the fundamental purpose of reorganization proceedings to
enable the debtor to continue operations. ' 9 That there was little or
no equity in the collateral was virtually of no significance.
In In re Bermec Corp.,'9 8 a case decided four years after Yale
Express, the Second Circuit was a bit more vigilant of the secured
creditors' interests. The debtor was in the business of leasing trucks
and tractor-trailers throughout the United States and Canada. As
was the case in Yale Express, a large part of the equipment owned
by Bermec was subject to security interests in favor of various creditors. 199 Bermec Corp. filed a petition under Chapter XI of the Bank200
ruptcy Act and then filed an amended petition under Chapter X.
The secured creditors opposed the latter petition as not being filed in
good faith because it was "unreasonable to expect that a plan of
reorganization [could] be effected" within the meaning of section
146(3) of the Act.20 1 The referee in bankruptcy found that it was not
unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization would be ef192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

384 F.2d at 991.
See Id. at 992.
Id. at 439.
384 F.2d at 992.
Id.
Id. at 991.
445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 368.
Id. at 367.
Id.
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fected and, accordingly, the distict judge approved the petition.

02

Circuit.203

This determination was upheld on appeal to the Second
The secured creditors, in opposing approval of the petition,
raised the issue of depreciation and the need for quick enforcement
of their liens in order to protect their interests.20 In Bermec, however, the trustee deviated from the approach taken in Yale Express

and offered to pay to the secured creditors an amount equal to the
economic depreciation of the encumbered equipment "so as to approximately preserve their status quo."205 The appellate court did
not explicitly rule on this approach, although it did uphold the finding below that the trustee would be able to make such payments.2 06

Subsequently, the referee, in an unpublished opinion, 07 again found
that "payment to secured creditors of the amount of the economic

depreciation of the equipment securing their claims was 'a fair and
equitable method of protecting the interests of the secured

creditors.'

"o208

Yale Express and Bermec both illustrate the extent of protection and encouragement a court will afford a debtor in a reorganiza-

tion proceeding so that the salutary purposes of rehabilitation can be
effectuated. The decision in Yale undoubtedly represented the most

liberal application of the court's power to permit the continued use
of collateral by the debtor where loss to the secured creditor was a

near certainty.209
The Bermec decision is significant for its recognition of the pro202. Id. at 368. The referee, appointed as a special master by the district court judge to
hear and report on the approval of the petition, found that despite present losses of $500,000
each month, certain affirmative steps with regard to the operations of the business could be
taken which could result in a profitable or at least a break-even operation. Id.
203. Id. at 369.
204. Id. at 368.
205. Id. at 369.
206. See id.
207. In re Bermec Corp., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64,065 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 15,
1971)(summary of opinion of Referee Herzog).
208. Murphy, supra note 28, at 35 (footnote omitted) (citing to the unpublished opinion
of Referee Herzog); cf. Crystal v. Green Point Sav. Bank (In re Franklin Garden Apartments), 124 F.2d 451, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1941)(Chapter X proceeding where court allowed turnover from mortgagee to trustee of apartment building although debtor had a negligible equity;
debtor's use of rents from building restricted to operating costs and expenses, and remainder
required to be paid over to mortgagee, except to extent that mortgaged property received benefit through the proceeding or mortgagee's rights were fully secured).
209. It has been suggested that Yale Express has little support in prior bankruptcy case
law and constitutes a violation of the fifth amendment rights of the secured creditor. Murphy,
supra note 28, at 34.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

1178

[Vol. 10:1149

priety of reimbursing the secured creditor for depreciation in the economic or real value of its collateral. It is also noteworthy that Bermec supports the implication that, absent such reimbursement,
foreclosure might be permitted.21 0 The concept of interim compensation as a means of avoiding harm to the secured creditor was expressly incorporated into the adequate protection provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code211 and, consequently, will be a significant factor in
the courts' evaluation of a complaint for relief from the automatic
12
stay.1
Undue Significance Accorded the Equity Consideration

(iii)

The foregoing analysis of the issues that bankruptcy courts addressed under the Act in determining whether to grant relief from a
stay in a bankruptcy proceeding reveals that the courts accord each
component varying degrees of weight according to the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the proceeding. At times
the balancing process obfuscates the determinative issue and leaves
one with the sense that the aggregate of circumstances impelled the
court to propound a decision it felt to be proper.213 Many times,
however, often because of the particular chapter proceeding, the
bankruptcy courts have attached undue significance to the amount of
equity in the collateral. 1 4
There are.

. .

considerations which may amount to red herrings of

a sort. One of these is the oft mentioned concern as to how much
equity the debtor has in property sought by a secured creditor....

[I]f a debtor badly needs the property and its vital signs

are strong, the size of its equity shouldn't have much bearing on
the situation, although a large equity does make a decision
favorable to the debtor more palatable for all concerned.21 5
Equity is, indeed, a red herring and the use of the equity analysis as the sole determinative component in assessing an application
210. The court of appeals in Bermec did not explicitly require the making of interim
payments but did uphold the concept. See 445 F.2d at 369.
211. 1.1U.S.C. § 361(1); see S. Rep., supra note 10, at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5840.
212. See In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp., 6 Bankr. 463, 467 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re

Mulcahy, 5 Bankr. 558, 563-64 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re Pleasant Valley, Inc., 6 Bankr.
13, 17-18 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980).
213. See Festersen, supra note 4, at 317. The author states that "courts will find the

power and forge the weapons to achieve the result considered to be desirable." Id.
214. See supra notes 182, 183 and accompanying text.

215.

Festersen, supra note 4, at 333.
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for relief from a stay would be Procrustean. Equity in the collateral
indicates that the security can depreciate in value while the debtor
uses it without affecting the secured creditor's interest. It is not a
talisman, the presence of which magically empowers a court to make
decisions it would not make in the absence of equity. Equity is simply one means of protecting the creditor's interest in the collateral.
Some courts under the Bankruptcy Code have extolled the concept of equity and have mechanically applied an equity cushion analysis when interpreting adequate protection in assessing a petition for
relief from the automatic stay.2"6 The following sections will discuss
the mechanics of the automatic stay and the concept of adequate
protection under the Code and, thereafter, the defects inherent in a
stringent application of the equity cushion analysis.
V. ADEQUATE PROTECTION AND THE EQUITY CUSMON UNDER
THE CODE
In Mueller v. Nugent,21 7 decided shortly after the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the United States Supreme Court declared that a petition in bankruptcy is "a caveat to all the world, and
in effect an attachment and injunction. 218 This judicial gloss indicates an early recognition that a stay of creditors from collecting
their claims against the debtor and his property is indispensable to
bankruptcy administration. The fresh start sought by the debtor in
invoking the bankruptcy laws is likely to be compromised by permitting the continuation of actions against him. Upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition under the new law, all the debtor's property becomes property of the estate and is brought into the custody of the
bankruptcy court;219 no interference with that custody can be countenanced without the court's permission. 220 The bankruptcy court's
control has been buttressed with statutory power, in addition to its
inherent power as a court of equity, to enjoin litigation and acts of
creditors and others insofar as necessary to effectuate the bank216. See supra note 30; infra notes 274-318 and accompanying text.
217. 184 U.S. 1 (1902).
218. Id. at 14.
219. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (commencement of voluntary, joint, and involuntary
cases), 541 (property of the estate), 542 (turnover of property to the estate); 28 U.S.C. §
1471(e) (Supp. III 1979)(bankruptcy courts' exclusive jurisdiction over all debtor's property).
The debtor, after the property comes into the estate, is permitted to exempt certain property out of the estate for his use and possession. 11 U.S.C. § 522.
220. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
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ruptcy objectives.221 In addition, with the passage of the new Bankruptcy Code, Congress has conferred statutory status on the automatic stay for all classes of cases commenced under the new Code.
A.

Mechanics of the Automatic Stay

A petition filed under the new Chapter 11 triggers an automatic
stay, 223 as did the filing of a petition pursuant to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 4 As under prior law, the stay becomes operative
immediately whether the petition is voluntary or involuntary. 225 The
new bankruptcy law, unlike prior law, does not recognize or permit
any different effect to be given the stay because of the chapter under
which the case was commenced.2 26 Chapter 11 of the Code 27 synthesizes Chapters X, XI, and XII of the old Act. By combining the
business rehabilitation chapters, the courts will now be able to assess
a petition for relief from the stay without concern for the particular
relief chapter involved and the ability of the court to affect secured
creditors without consent.
The automatic stay is applicable to all entities, 28 including a
creditor holding a secured claim, and operates against the following:
the commencement or continuation of any judicial, administrative,
or other kind of proceeding to enforce any claim against the
debtor; 29 "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate; ' 230 "any act to create, perfect, or enforce
any lien against property of the estate"'231 or property of the
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. III 1979).
11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922, 1301. This article deals only with section 362.
11 U.S.C. § 362.
BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-601(a), 11-44(a), 12-43(a).
See 11 U.S.C. 99 103, 301, 303, 362.
See 11 U.S.C. 99 103, 362. Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts would inevitably

give consideration to the particular chapter proceeding in which the stay arose. This was because in a Chapter XI case a debtor could only alter or modify the rights of unsecured creditors whereas in Chapter X a secured creditor could be affected. See SEC v. American Trailer
Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); see also supra notes 49, 77 and accompanying text.
227. 11 U.S.C. §9 1101-1174.
228. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The Bankruptcy Code defines "entity" to include a person,

estate, trust, or governmental unit. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). "Person" is defined to include an
individual, partnership, or corporation, but it does not include a governmental unit. 11 U.S.C.

§ 101(30).
229.

11 U.S.C.

§

362(a)(1).

230. 11 U.S.C. 9 362(a)(3). This includes a stay of self-help rights of repossession under
section 9-502 of the U.C.C. and rights of reclamation under sections 2-502 and 2-702 of the
U.C.C.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).
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debtor; 23 2 any act to collect a claim against the debtor arising before
the commencement of the case;2 83 and the setoff on any debt owing
to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.23 ' In
short, the stay provision is comprehensive and almost all-inclusive, 3 5
though it is not the exclusive remedy available to the bankruptcy
court to restrain entities from interfering with the case. The bankruptcy court also has the power to issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions237
of
the Code;236 the power of a court of law, equity, and admiralty;
and the power to issue writs under the all writs statute. 238
As was previously discussed, the filing of a Chapter 11 business
reorganization petition exposes the secured creditor to a serious risk
of diminution in value of his collateral because of depreciation as the
debtor continues to use the property in its business. 23 9 The debtor in
possession 24 in a Chapter 11 case is expected to continue business
operations 24 1 and may in the ordinary course of business, use, lease,
or sell any of the assets of the estate without authorization of the
court.242 The property, however, will undoubtedly remain in the
232. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5). This paragraph differs from 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) in that
it also stays any act to enforce a lien arising prior to the filing of the petition against property
acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the case or property which is exempt under
11 U.S.C. § 522. See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 19-21.
233. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). This paragraph prevents efforts by creditors to collect prepetition debts by telephone calls or other informal means of coercion. See Kennedy, supra note
11, at 21-22.
234. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7). Although the right to set off pre-petition debts is stayed by
the filing of a petition, the right of setoff is not abrogated. See 11 U.S.C. § 553.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(l)-(8). Section 362(b) of the Code contains eight explicit limitations on the operation of the stay provided for in subsection (a). For a discussion of these
exceptions, see Kennedy, supra note 11, at 24-37.
236. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Section 105(a) is derived from section 2a(15) of the Bankruptcy Act. See House Report, supra note 11, at 316, reprintedin 1978 CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6273, 6298.
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. III 1979).
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
240. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1).
241. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (procedure governing appointment of trustee), § 1107
(debtor in possession has virtually all rights and duties of trustee), § 1108 (trustee may operate
business without court authorization).
242. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1). Cash collateral is the only exception to this grant of power.
11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2). The debtor must apply for permission to use a bank account or cash
that is subject to security agreements, and the court cannot grant such permission until secured creditors have been given notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 11 U.S.C. §
363(c)(2). It should also be noted that "after notice and a hearing" means after such notice
and hearing "as [are] appropriate in the particular circumstances"; notice alone will suffice if
the court determines that "there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced" before an
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debtor's hands if its use is essential to the debtor's business. Both the
oversecured creditor, fearing diminution of its equity cushion, and
the undersecured creditor, running the risk that its collateral will depreciate until it is valueless, will seek additional protection or relief
from the stay.
The last four subsections of section 362 govern relief from the
automatic stay. Subsection (d)(1) 24 3 follows the basic pattern of the
comparable subdivision of the automatic stay rules. 44 Specifically,
section 362(d)(1) empowers the court to terminate, annul, modify, or
condition the stay of a party in interest for cause, including the lack
of adequate protection of such party. 45
The hearing requirements for a section 362(d) request to alter a
stay are stringent. 4 6 If the court does not order a final hearing or a
continuance of the stay within thirty days of the request by a party
in interest, the stay terminates automatically. 4 The court may continue the stay only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party
opposed to the request for relief will prevail and if the final hearing
is commenced within thirty days of the preliminary hearing.248 Thus,
a final hearing must be commenced within sixty days of the request.
The party making the request (the secured creditor) must prove only
that the debtor has no equity in the property; 249 the burden of proof
on all other issues is upon the party opposing the request.2 50 Furthermore, the court is empowered to grant relief from the stay without a
hearing, if an entity with an interest in the property affected will
suffer irreparable damage.2 51
act (such as releasing cash collateral from a bank account for the debtor's use) must be done,
and the court authorizes such act. I I U.S.C. § 102(1). See In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr.
350 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980).
243. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest . ...
Id.
244. BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d).
245. See supra note 243.
246. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(e).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Id. § 362(g)(1).
250. Id. § 362(g)(2).
251. Id. § 362(0.
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Groundsfor Relief From the Stay Under the Code

When the holder of a claim secured by a lien on property of the
estate or property of the debtor requests relief from the automatic
stay, the holder of the secured claim is entitled to "adequate protection" of his interest in the property. 52 "'[A]dequate protection' has
been established in the Code as the touchstone against which complaints to dissolve or modify the stay must be tested. ' 25 This standard, as mandated by the Code, is applied as a matter of right and
not as a matter of discretion.2 54 "Adequate protection must be applied in light of the peculiar facts of each case and upon the equitable considerations arising therefrom. 255
Adequate protection is a concept which Congress intentionally
left undefined.2 58 Instead, section 361 of the Code enumerates three

nonexclusive methods of providing adequate protection to an entity
with an interest in property of the debtor. 57 If the value of the secured creditor's collateral will decrease during the proceedings, the
trustee may be required to make periodic cash payments to the secured creditor. 58 Alternatively, the holder of the secured claim may
be granted an additional or replacement lien on other property of the
estate.25 ' In addition, the court may approve other forms of relief
which will protect the interest of the secured creditor.260 These ex252. Id. § 362(d)(1). Adequate protection is also required before certain kinds of collateral may be used, sold, or leased by the trustee or before a lien prior or equal to the creditor's
lien may be granted. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(e), 364(d).
253. City National Bank v. San Clemente Estates (In re San Clemente Estates), 5
Bankr. 605, 609 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980). The concept of adequate protection initially arose
from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.
1935), "where he indicated the term was vague but it intended that the secured claim must be
compensated completely. Then he introduced the equally vague corollary of 'indubitable equivalence.'" 5 Bankr. at 609.
254. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11361.01, at 361-5 (15th ed. 1981).
255. City National Bank v. San Clemente Estates (In re San Clemente Estates), 5
Bankr. 605, 609 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); see H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 339, reprintedin
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6295.
256. In re Family Inv. Inc., 8 Bankr. 572, 576 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981); see In re Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr. 679, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re Pitts, 2 Bankr. 476, 477
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979).
257. 11 U.S.C. § 361.
258. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1). See In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp., 6 Bankr. 463, 467 (Bankr. S.D.
W. Va. 1980); In re Pleasant Valley, Inc., 6 Bankr. 13, 17-18 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980).
259. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2).
260. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3). This subsection is a catch-all provision which allows the court
to fashion relief by allowing adequate protection to be provided by the granting of such other
relief "as will result in the realization by such entity [having an interest in the debtor's property] of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such property." 11 U.S.C. §
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amples are not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive, but are rather
to illustrate means whereby adequate protection may be provided
and to define the contours of the concept itself.81 Moreover, it is not
for the court to devise the method of providing adequate protection;
rather, it is incumbent upon the debtor to propose the method to be
used.262 If the party that is affected by the action objects to the proposed method, a bankruptcy court may determine whether the form
of protection proffered reflects the spirit and intent of section 361.263
It is apparent that the policy of adequate protection under the
Code is drawn from cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act.26 ' The
Bankruptcy Rules, which allowed relief from the stay for cause
shown,265 were interpreted to require consideration of a number of
factors,266 including the presence of equity, 87 the likelihood of harm
to the creditor, 268 prospects for reorganization, 26 9 and the essentiality
of the property to the successful rehabilitation of the debtor.2 70 Similarly, section 362(d)(1) of the Code provides that the court shall
grant relief for cause.27 1 Despite this apparent similarity in language
and purpose between the relief provisions of the Rules, as applied to
the Act, and the Code, many courts have abandoned the guidance of
the case law under the Act and have applied an equity cushion analysis in determining whether to grant relief from the stay.2 72
C.

The Equity Cushion Analysis and Its Infirmities
Deciding whether to continue or vacate the stay solely on the

361(3).
261. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 338, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6295.
262. Id.
263. In re Family Investments, Inc., 8 Bankr. 572, 576 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
264. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940); Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1971); In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935); In re American Kitchen Foods,
Inc., 9 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 537 (Bankr. N.D. Me. June 8, 1976); see S. REP., supra
note 10, at 49, 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5835, 5840.
265. BANKR. RULES, supra note 6, 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d).
266. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
362.01[3], at 362-21 (15th ed. 1981)(cases
cited therein); Kennedy, supra note 28, at 238-45; Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at
1225-33; Seidman, supra note 28, at 346; Webster, supra note 117, 218-26.

267. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying tcxt.
268.
269.

See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.

270. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
271.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

272. See supra note 30.
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ground of the debtor's equity in the property is an unwarranted departure from practice under the Act and may produce unjust results,
such as where the encumbered property is so vital to the operation of
the debtor's business that foreclosure would prove ruinous, not only
to the debtor, but to other creditors as well. For the very reason that
section 361 is based on the concept of adequate protection as it developed in stay litigation under the Bankruptcy Act,27 the courts
should look to the standards which evolved thereunder 7 4 to formulate guidelines for determining whether a creditor would be adequately protected during the continuation of the automatic stay.
An example of the unjust result which may occur because of
undue reliance on the debtor's equity in the property should prove
illustrative. 75 Suppose a land developer takes a $500,000 bank loan
to finance construction of an apartment complex. The bank's appraisal shows that the undeveloped property securing the loan is
worth $1,000,000. "The developer.

. .

incurs cost overruns and con-

struction delays which render it impossible to complete the project
for occupancy before the loan is in default."276 A Chapter 11 petition is filed by the developer. Further hardship befalls the developer
as the state and federal governments pass environmental protection
legislation that makes construction more costly, "and the developer's
permit from the county government approaches expiration at a time
when local opposition is mobilized against the project. 27 When the
bank seeks relief from the automatic stay, it prepares a new appraisal showing that the value of the property now equals the
amount of the secured debt. A court confronted with these circumstances may find that the developer no longer has any equity in the
real estate and that the project is accruing unpaid taxes and interest
to the detriment of the secured creditor. On the other hand, the developer may be able to salvage the project in time and produce substantial equity for itself and all creditors. 78
273.

See supra notes 269 & 271.

274. See supra notes 28 & 266.
275. This example is found in Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at 1227.
276. Id.
277.

Id.

278. Id. at 1227-28; cf. C.I. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Assocs. (In re Nevada Towers
Assocs.), 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 146 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1977)(despite mortgagee's request for relief from stay, Chapter XII debtor with no equity in uncompleted apartment building permitted to remain in possession and complete building because court found
purpose of Chapter XII to be rehabilitation and completed building would be more valuable to

both debtor and mortgagee).
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A court cannot resolve this problem by mechanically invoking
an equity cushion analysis. The presence or absence of equity in the
property does not, in and of itself, militate for or against the continuation or vacation of the stay. The court must also consider whether
the property's value may continue to decrease, resulting in harm to
the secured creditor; whether the debtor has a reasonable prospect of
rehabilitation; and whether the property is vital to the operation of
the debtor's business.27 Only then can the court make an informed
judgment.
In Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lake Tahoe Land Co.,2 80
the holder of a first deed of trust on vacant land, part of which was
forest land and part of which had been subdivided into parcels for
condominiums, sought to vacate the automatic stay imposed by virtue of a Chapter 11 petition. The court, after grappling with the
valuation issue, which is ultimately involved in the process of making
an equity determination,281 found that there was insufficient land
value to adequately protect the debt due the creditor.2 82 The court
also found that termination of the stay was appropriate for causes
independent of the adequate protection issue. 8 It is noteworthy,
however, that the court observed in dictum that a 40 to 50 percent
cushion for lenders on partly developed raw land would be necessary
to afford adequate protection.2
In another recent case, City National Bank v. San Clemente
Estates, 288 the court stated that the equity cushion method has been
widely adopted in decisions interpreting section 361 of the Code,288
and held that a 65 percent cushion for a first lienholder on land securing a construction loan was adequate protection. 287 The court
noted, however, that if development projections were not met and the
land had to be marketed in its present undeveloped condition, a new
279.
280.
281.

Peitzman and Smith, supra note 16, at 1228; see supra note 266.
(In re Lake Tahoe Land Co.), 5 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980).
See supra notes 166-81 and accompanying text.

282. 5 Bankr. at 36. The property was found to have a value of $1,856,960 while the
debt due the plaintiff exceeded two million dollars, leaving the creditor undersecured. Id.
283. Id. at 36-37. The plaintiff's debt had been due and payable for four years, there
were tax delinquencies and a staggering amount of unpaid interest, and certain acts of the

debtor had been in violation of the security contract to the detriment of the creditor. Id.
284.

Id. at 37; In re Sulzer, 2 Bankr. 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); Fidelity Bond and

Mortgage Co. v. McAloon (In re McAloon), I Bankr. 766 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); Vlahos v."
Pitts (In re Pitts), 2 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979).
285. (In re San Clemente Estates), 5 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).

286.

Id. at 609.

287.

Id. at 610.
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valuation of the property would be required, resulting in an approxicushion, which would be "precariously close to bemately 6 percent288
ing inadequate.
The court more importantly observed, in obeisance to the drafters of the Code, that "this quantitative approach may have the salutary effect of giving precise guidance as to the standard to be used,
but it does seem to be inconsistent with the congressional intent that
each case is to be judged on its own facts."' 2 8 ' This precise guidance,
which results from the use of the equity cushion analysis, is, indeed,
inconsistent with the congressional intent and also with the historical
development of stay litigation. The language and purpose of the stay
provisions under the Act and the Code are quite similar and there
seems to be no sound basis for deviation from the approach developed under the Act in assessing a petition for relief from the stay
under the Code.
The court in Midlantic National Bank v. Anchorage Boat
Sales, Inc., 90 also acknowleged this similarity between the Act and
the Rules, and the Code.29 1 A secured creditor that provided the
debtor, a retailer of new and used pleasure boats, with floor plan
financing, filed a complaint seeking relief from the automatic stay in
a Chapter 11 proceeding.29 2 Having concluded that the undersecured
creditor was entitled to relief under section 362(d)(2),2 9 3 the court
analyzed the complaint for relief under section 362(d)(1) in light of
the law as it existed under the Bankruptcy Act and Rules. It supported the granting of relief under this section as well, finding that
the debtor had no reasonable possibility of reorganization and no equity in the collateral.29
The result in Anchorage was a foregone conclusion in that there
was absolutely no possibility that the debtor could reorganize itself.
It is refreshing, however, that the court acknowledged the consensus
doctrine that had developed under previous law that four factors
were relevant, not just the extent of equity, in determining whether a
288.

Id. at 611. This 6% figure includes costs associated with the sale of the property in

bulk that could amount to as much as 12% of the sales price. Id.
289. Id. at 610 (citing H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 6295).
290. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).

291. Id. at 641-42.
292.

Id. at 636.

293.

Id. at 641. For a discussion of section 362(d)(2), see Kennedy, supra note 11, at

44-45; supra note 21.
294. 4 Bankr. at 642.
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creditor should be granted relief from the stay. 295 The court continued by stating that it is "apparent that the policy of adequate protection is drawn from cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act" 298
and that because adequate protection under the Code is "based on
the concept of adequate protection as it developed in stay litigation
under the Bankruptcy Act, the Court should look to these cases to
formulate standards for determining whether a creditor would be ad297
equately protected during the continuation of the automatic stay."
These factors, as the Anchorage court indicated, should be balanced
in evaluating a petition for relief from the stay, and should supplant
the equity cushion analysis currently applied by some bankruptcy
courts.
The court in Ingersoll-Rand Financial Corp. v. 5-Leaf Clover
Corp.,29 8 conscious of the flexibility of bankruptcy courts "to fashion
.. .relief in light of the facts of each case and general equitable
principles," 299 found that the small equity cushion present in mining
equipment owned by the debtors would be maintained by their making regular payments at least equal to the combined depreciation
and interest on the debt.300 In this manner, the equity ratio, found by
the court to be so important, would be maintained at the appropriate
level. Were the debtors unable to make these payments, the stay
would be lifted and the mining equipment so vital to the debtors'
operations would be repossessed by the secured creditor.30 1
The court, after acknowledging that reorganization would be
unlikely without the use of the mining equipment,0 2 never gave any
consideration to the likelihood of a successful reorganization. Instead, the court ordered the debtors to make a payment of $35,000
to the secured creditor within fifteen days, even though there existed
an equity cushion of approximately twice the amount of the payment.30 This payment undoubtedly impaired the chances of the
debtors' reorganization. If the court had addressed the issue of likeli295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.; see supra note 264; see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.01[3], at 36221 (15th ed. 1981)(cases cited therein).
298. (In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp.), 6 Bankr. 463 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1980).
299. Id. at 466; see H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 6295.
300. 6 Bankr. at 467.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 468. The court found that the debtors' equity was deteriorating at a rate of
$35,000 per month and would be totally dissipated in less than 60 days. Id.
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hood of a successful reorganization, it might have found that there
was a reasonable likelihood of success. It then could have eliminated
this prohibitive payment and allowed the debtors to provide in their
plan of reorganization for payments over time to the secured creditor, with appropriate interest. These payments would be fully compensatory. 0 4 Such a plan would have truly manifested the flexibility
of bankruptcy courts and their equitable powers in a rehabilitation
proceeding. It does not seem unreasonable to ask for the assistance
of a secured creditor in the financing of a debtor's reorganization
where the creditor will be fully compensated in deferred payments
and there is a high likelihood of a successful reorganization. In
order to confirm an arrangement of this nature, however, the court
must first, of course, determine the likelihood of a successful
reorganization.30 5
The question of whether an equity cushion is necessary to provide adequate protection under section 362(d)(1) was recently raised
in Bankers Life Insurance Co. of Nebraska v. Alyucan Interstate
Corp.308 The debtor, a construction and real estate development firm,
filed a Chapter 11 petition, and the secured creditor, holder of a
trust deed on realty, sought relief from the automatic stay under section 362(d)(1).3 07 The court, in a well-reasoned decision, determined
that under section 362(d) several issues must be addressed: First,
what is the interest in property being protected;308 second, what as304.

The court, in order to confirm such a plan, would have to find that the secured

creditor would receive at least what it would have received under a Chapter 7 liquidation. I1
U.S.C. § I129(a)(7). Also, if the class of secured claims of which the creditor is a member

does not accept the plan, the court still can confirm the plan if the payments are made in cash
and the creditor retains its lien securing such claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1), (2). See Klee,
supra note 91, at 133.

305. If the court does not find that there is a reasonable likelihood of a successful reorganization, then the plan cannot be confirmed because it would not be feasible under section
1129(a)(11) and would possibly be in violation of the good faith requirement contained in
section 1129(a)(3). 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3), (11); see 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1

1129.02[3], [11] (15th ed. 1981).
The fact that the Code contains this feasibility requirement for a Chapter 11 plan is

evidence that the Code contemplates the court's consideration of the likelihood of a successful
reorganization. "Section 1129(a)(1 1) requires the court to carefully scrutinize the plan to determine whether it offers a reasonable prospect of success and is workable." 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1 1129.02[11], at 1129-33 (15th ed. 1981).
306. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).

307.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); see supra note 243.

308.

12 Bankr. at 806-07. The court found this factor important because the protection

afforded a secured party may depend upon the particular interest and property involved. Id.
The interest in property involved in the proceeding was the creditor's lien on the realty of the
debtor. Id. at 809.
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pects of the interest in property require protection;30 9 third, from
what is the interest in property being protected;3 10 and fourth, what
is the method of protection?3 11 The court concluded that since the
collateral, and therefore the lien, were neither declining nor subject
to sudden depreciation in value, the creditor suffered no harm cognizable under section 362 as a result of the stay. 3 12 Accordingly, the
court denied relief from the stay.3 1
In a trenchant analysis, the court, in dictum, rejected the current trend in case law toward defining adequate protection in terms
of an equity cushion.3 1" The analysis was predicated upon four
grounds, one of which was the fact that the cushion analysis has no
basis in the historical development of stay litigation. 1 5 The stay pro309. 12 Bankr. at 807-08. The court noted that "[a]dequate protection is concerned with
the value of the interest in property." Id. at 807. Therefore, "the 'interest in property' entitled
to protection is not measured by the amount of the debt but by the value of the [allowed
secured claim]." Id. at 808. This is important because accruing interest and taxes may be
immaterial if they do not affect the value of the collateral, while fluctuations in the market
affecting the value of the collateral may be highly relevant to adequate protection. Id. The
collateral in Alyucan was of sufficient value to protect the creditor. Id. at 809.
310. The court tersely asserted that the interest in property was being protected "from
any impairment in value attributable to the stay." Id. at 808. It continued by stating that only
declines in value of the collateral that are direct results of the stay must be recompensed. Id.
at 808-09. In relation to the proceeding, this factor had no relevance in that the collateral was
not declining or subject to sudden depreciation in value. Id. at 809.
311. This factor is necessarily involved in any proceeding for relief from the stay. The
court essentially noted that the method of protection will vary with the interest in property
being protected and that the debtor need only adequately protect the interest in the collateral
to the extent of any decline in value caused by the stay. Id. There was no need to consider this
factor in the proceeding because the creditor was suffering no harm as a result of the stay and
thus required no protection. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See Id. at 809-13.
315. Id. at 810-12. The court noted three other grounds upon which it rejected the equity cushion analysis: "(I) It is inconsistent with the purpose of adequate protection. (2) It is
inconsistent with the illustrations of adequate protection found in Section 361. (3) It is inconsistent with the statutory scheme of Section 362(d)." Id. at 810.
The court stated that equity cushion analysis is inconsistent with the statutory scheme in
that "[u]nder 362(d)(2) a lack of equity, absent a further showing that the property is unnecessary to an effective reorganization, does not warrant relief from the stay." Id. at 811. Semantically, this is correct. The court proceeded and reflected on this language stating that
[t] his statutory provision expresses a legislative judgment. first, that it is the absence
of equity rather than any particular cushion which is the criterion for relief from
[the] stay, and second, that the absence of equity is not alone dispositive-the court
must still weigh the necessity of the property to an effective reorganization. The
cushion analysis in inconsistent with this judgment.
Id. at 811 (emphasis in original).
Though section 362(d) is phrased in the disjunctive, see I1 U.S.C. § 362(d), and section
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visions under the Bankruptcy Act allowed relief for cause shown,
which "was interpreted to require consideration of a number of factors, including the presence of equity, the likelihood of harm to the
creditor, prospects for reorganization, and essentiality of the property in the operation of the estate."316
The Alyucan court has identified the proper judicial methodology in determining whether to grant relief from a stay because of
lack of adequate protection. The court, in rejecting the equity cushion analysis, evinces a sensitive awareness of the objectives of Chapter 11 and rehabilitation. Adherence to the cushion analysis can, indeed, work unjust results and its rigidity is contrary to the equitable
powers reposed in the bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy courts should
follow the lead of Alyucan and put the presence or absence of equity
in its proper perspective. The lack of equity in the collateral should
not sound the death knell for the debtor where a consideration of the
other factors warrants continuation of the stay.
VI. CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy courts' recent tendency under the Bankruptcy
Code to predicate determinations of whether relief from the automatic stay should be granted on an equity cushion analysis constitutes an unwarranted and undesirable departure from the analysis
employed under the Bankruptcy Act. The balancing process utilized
under the Act, employing equity as one variable among many, allowed the courts to accord each component appropriate weight depending on the circumstances of each case so that the rehabilitative
objectives of Chapter 11 would be effectuated.
Although the equity cushion analysis enjoys ease of application
and practical appeal,3 17 it is contrary to the legislative directive that
the facts in each case be considered to determine whether relief is
appropriate.318 The approach developed under the stay provisions of
the Act, however, is responsive to this command. It affords the court
the necessary flexibility in addressing the unique factual configuration that confronts the court in each reorganization case. Therefore,
362(d)(2) was designed to obviate a very specific abuse of the bankruptcy system, an act
against property, id. § 362(d)(2), the court's analysis in Alyucan is a compelling one, and
indicates the proper role equity should play in determining whether to grant relief from the
stay. For a discussion of the derivation and purpose of section 362(d)(2), see supra note 21.
316. 12 Bankr. at 811-12.
317. Id. at 810.
318. H.R. REP., supra note 11, at 344, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6300.
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the courts, under the Code, should revert to the balancing approach
developed under the Act and use the equity cushion as only one factor in determining whether to grant relief from the automatic stay.
Lawrence J. Dash
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